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Using daily data on inflation-indexed bonds, we find evidence of a negative relationship 
between ECB communication regarding risks to price stability - measured on the basis of the 
frequency and strength of the keyword ‘vigilance’ - and changes in euro area break-even 
inflation. However, this result is only found for the second half of 2005. At that time, the start 
of a tightening of ECB monetary policy was increasingly likely. This suggests that 
communication should be closely in line with policy actions before it can be effective. Still, 
we also find that the economic significance of this type of communication has been small. 
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Nederlandsche Bank. `Importantly, signalling vigilance proved instrumental in reaching a common
understanding with the markets: the ECB, though observationally inactive,
was at any time ready to start action'
Jean-Claude Trichet (2006), p. 9.
1 Introduction
Expectations are key for macroeconomic developments. The importance of this
insight is widely recognized by central banks. For example, the European Cen-
tral Bank (ECB) recently wrote: `Stabilising the private sector's in°ation ex-
pectations is a prerequisite for monetary policy to be able e±ciently to achieve
the objective of price stability.' ECB (2006) (p.59). The determinants of ex-
pectations are less well understood. This paper investigates whether it is pos-
sible for central banks to in°uence private sector expectations through commu-
nication.
There is, by now, compelling evidence that central bank communication af-
fects developments in ¯nancial markets. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007), for
instance, ¯nd that communications by the Federal Reserve, the ECB, and the
Bank of England have been an important driver of ¯nancial markets. This
suggests that communication a®ects, in some way, the expectations of private
agents. However, their is still little direct on the e®ects of communication on
expectations. Therefore, this paper uses the concept of break-even in°ation
to measure the impact of central bank communication on private sector ex-
pectations.
In particular, we study the relationship between euro area in°ation ex-
pectations and ECB communications regarding risks to price stability in recent
years. This sample period is particularly interesting as it contains two distinct
episodes. Between June 2003 and December 2005, the ECB maintained its main
re¯nancing rate at a level of 2%. However, during this period in°ation worries
frequently arose. For example, in°ation expectations as derived from in°ation-
indexed bonds showed sharp increases at times. This has lead the ECB to voice
its concerns by signalling that it was `vigilant' regarding upward risks to price
1stability. As `vigilance' is a clear keyword to communicate concerns to ¯nancial
markets, we use its occurrence to identify the e®ects of communication on in°a-
tion expectations.1 From Autumn-2005 onwards, markets observers regarded a
change in the ECB's policy stance increasingly likely given the incoming macro-
economic data.2 As it thus became more likely that words would be followed
by deed, the e®ects of the ECB's communications may have been di®erent than
earlier during this period. Finally, from December 2005 onwards, the ECB has
raised the main re¯nancing rate a number of times. Interestingly, the keyword
`vigilance' continued to be used in ECB communication. It was, however, used
less frequently. Also, its interpretation has changed. It can still be seen as an
indication of the ECB's unease regarding risks to price stability, but it is also
strongly perceived by market participants as an indicator of upcoming policy
changes.3 This raises the question of whether this type of ECB communication
has had similar e®ects on in°ation expectations in this period as in the period
2003 - 2005.
Our key ¯nding is that the relationship between the ECB's signalling of
in°ation risks (through the use of `vigilance') and euro area break-even in°ation
has been varying over time. We only ¯nd evidence for a signi¯cant relationship
between communication and changes in break-even in°ation during October
and November 2005. This suggests that communication should be closely in
line with policy actions before it can be e®ective. Still, we also ¯nd that the
economic signi¯cance of this type of communication has been small.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the
relationship between central bank communication and in°ation expectations.
1ECB president Trichet (2005) has noted: `Our concern ..... was signalled to the market
from autumn 2003 in the press conference. Over time, our communication became increasingly
`alert', signalling our vigilance to the upside risks to in°ation which grew at the time.'
2For instance, the Consensus survey on 14 November indicated that almost 40% of the
respondents expected a rate increase within 30 days.
3According to Bloomberg, `ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet has used the word \vig-
ilant" to °ag each of the six rate increases since late 2005' (Bloomberg News, 15 February
2007). Likewise, according to UBS: `Trichet has made a practice of e®ectively pre-announcing
hikes at the prior meeting with the use of the key "vigilant" phrase' (UBS FX Trade and
Research, 9 January 2007).
2Section 3 outlines how we obtained data on communication and in°ation ex-
pectations, while section 4 shortly describes this data. Section 5 presents our
empirical model, while section 6 shows the estimation results. Section 7 consid-
ers the robustness of our ¯ndings. Finally, section 8 o®ers our conclusions.
2 Communication and in°ation expectations
Why is in°uencing private sector expectations useful from the perspective of
the central bank? It is important to realize that the control of the central bank
over its ultimate goals, be it solely price stability or also output stabilization,
is very indirect. Most central banks try to in°uence economic developments by
changing borrowing conditions at the short end of the yield curve. Changes in
the policy rate then feed through into long-term interest rates, exchange rates,
asset prices and credit conditions, thus in°uencing, in the end, spending and
pricing decisions of private agents. However, it is not only the current policy
stance, but also the expected path of future interest rates that matters for
decisions of private agents. This expected path is crucially dependent on the
outlook for price developments and economic growth. Therefore, this opens the
possibility for central banks to a®ect current decisions by steering expectations
for these variables through communication.4
At the same time, it is possible to argue, from a theoretical perspective, that
communication has no value added with respect to expectations. If the central
bank has committed to a policy rule, if there are no information asymmetries,
and if economic agents have rational expectations, the private sector would be
able to infer the systemic part of policy from the central bank's actions, thus
rendering communication super°uous (see also Woodford (2006)). From a prac-
tical point of view, however, these conditions may be questioned. Interest rate
decision-making is often highly discretionary, information asymmetries between
4See also Blinder, Goodhart, Hildebrand, Lipton and Wyplosz (2001) or Woodford (2006).
Theoretically, Morris and Shin (2002) have argued that more public information is not neces-
sarily welfare-enhancing. Svensson (2006) has argued that this result holds only in very special
circumstances, which makes it empirically less relevant.
3the central bank and the private sector exist when central banks are less than
perfectly transparent, and empirical evidence on in°ation expectations has often
been in con°ict with the rational expectations hypothesis. Moreover, as noted,
empirical evidence strongly suggests that central bank communications a®ect
developments in ¯nancial markets.5
With respect to central bank communication on in°ation, a distinction should
be made between i) the announcement of a target for in°ation and ii) commu-
nication on in°ationary developments. Nowadays, many central banks have
publicly announced a target for in°ation. In the case of the ECB, this target is
speci¯ed as a year-on-year change in euro area HICP in°ation below, but close
to 2%. In general, if the public perceives the central bank as credible, long-run
in°ation expectations would be anchored around this target. Transitory shocks
may cause in°ation to di®er from this target, but should not necessarily af-
fect long-run expectations. GÄ urkaynak, Levin, and Swanson (2006) ¯nd, in this
context, that a well-known and credible in°ation target can help in anchoring
private sector views regarding long-run in°ation outcomes.6
How could the central bank then gain from regularly publishing its views
on expected economic developments, notably future in°ation? First, clear and
consistent communication may contribute to building reputation, in particular
if the track-record of the central bank concerned is short. Second, the cen-
tral bank can use communication in a situation in which in°ation expectations
deviate from target. Communication explaining the deviation and perhaps sug-
gesting possible policy reactions could guide expectations back to target. If
agents perceive the comments as new information, they accordingly adjust their
expectations, which would be re°ected in market prices. Given the develop-
ments over the sample period in this study, the latter mechanism is particularly
relevant.
5See Eij±nger and Geraats (2006) for recent evidence on central bank trans-
parency. Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2004) and Conlisk (1996) discuss rationality in survey
data of in°ation expectations.
6 Eusepi and Preston (2007) argue that announcing the in°ation target is not enough
for expectations stabilization: the central bank must also announce the associated values for
nominal interest rates and the output gap.
43 Measuring communication and in°ation ex-
pectations
Financial markets are continuously °ooded with information. It seems likely
that analysts and traders employ ¯ltering mechanisms to process the incoming
data.7 Central banks may, in turn, revert to a strategy of using keywords and key
phrases in their communication. In this paper, we focus on the use of `vigilance',
`vigilant' or variations thereof as an indicator of the ECB's perception of risks
to price stability.8
The ECB uses four main communication instruments. Firstly, there are the
press conferences given by the ECB president and vice-president after meetings
of the ECB's Governing Council. A second instrument is the publication of the
Monthly Bulletin of which in particular the editorial is scrutinised by analysts.
A third instrument are the testimonial hearings by the ECB president (or vice-
president) at the European Parliament. Finally, Governing Council members
often present their views in speeches and interviews. To search for the occurrence
of `vigilance' in communication, we use two main data sources: Bloomberg and
the ECB web-site. For the period between 2 June 2003 and 30 November 2005,
we searched the archive of Bloomberg News for ECB communications, yielding
a comprehensive data-set of over 2,000 news reports. For the period starting in
December 2005 we used the ECB web-site. In this latter case, we include i).
the ECB press conference, ii). the editorial of the ECB Monthly Bulletin, iii).
speeches by Trichet and Papademos.
Table 1 reports the list of people and keywords that were included in the
Bloomberg search. We included news reports if i). the comment referred to
7Mervyn King (2005), for instance, suggests how the public could use rules-of-thumb:`we
do not know whether - and, if so, to what extent - people use heuristics to make real economic
decisions. But a central bank should be alert to the possibility of their doing so.' (p. 12).
8There may be an issue of reverse causality, as the ECB's communications may be a
reaction to developments in (expected) in°ation. However, our identi¯cation strategy is based
on daily data. Although the ECB may very well use `vigilance' in reaction to a series of
upward changes in (expected) in°ation, it is less likely that each and every positive change in
break-even in°ation will entice the ECB to mention `vigilance'.
5Table 1: Key topics used in searching Bloomberg News
People Topics
Executive Board Tenure Decisions
Duisenberg (p) t 31/10/03 interest rates
Trichet (p) f 01/11/03
Papademos (vp) Economic analysis
Issing
Tumpel-Gugerell in°ation
Domingo Solans t 31/05/04 prices
Gonz¶ alez-P¶ aramo f 01/06/04 GDP
Padoa Schioppa t 31/05/05 economic growth




NCB presidents Country trade
Liebscher Austria Monetary analysis
Quaden Belgium
Vanhala Finland t 01/04/04 M3 (growth)
Louekoski f 01/04 t 12/07/04 money supply
Liikanen f 12/07/04 liquidity
Trichet France t 31/10/03
Noyer f 01/11/03 Exchange rate
Welteke Germany t 27/04/04
Weber f 30/04/04 euro
Garganas Greece euro-dollar






Notes: p = president/ vp= vice-president/ f = start date of tenure/ t = end date of tenure.
6euro area (as opposed to national) economic conditions, ii). concerned economic
issues as speci¯ed in the second column of table 1, and iii). contained new infor-
mation. This latter point implies that updates of news reports are only included
as far as they contain more detailed comments or comments on new issues. To
analyse this data, we performed keyword in context (KWIC) searches for occur-
rences of the words `vigilance' and `vigilant'.9 These KWIC searches generated
several useful pieces of information. Apart from knowing who made the com-
ments, and when, we also recorded how the term `vigilance' was used. For
example, some comments used `vigilance', while others used the terms `strong
vigilance' or `very strong vigilance'. We will further investigate the e®ects of
these di®erent formulations in section 5. The KWIC searches also reported the
topics to which `vigilance' referred. We will return to this information as part
of our robustness checks in section 7.
Research on in°ation expectations has so far mainly relied on survey data.
For our purposes, in°ation-indexed bonds are more suited as data is available
on a daily basis.10 This is useful in estimating the high-frequency impact of
communication. At the moment, few countries have issued bonds linked to euro
area in°ation which, as a consequence, somewhat limits us in our analysis. This
paper uses data on the OATei instrument: a French in°ation-indexed bond,
¯rst issued by the Agency France Tr¶ esor (AFT) in November 2001. The OATei
instrument is linked to the euro area HICP index (exclusive of tobacco prices)
and is best suited for our purposes as it is the longest time-series available.
We downloaded yields for the OATei 2012 series and the regular OAT 2012
from the AFT web-site (www.aft.gouv.fr). The di®erence in the yield of the
OAT and OATei, the so-called break-even in°ation, is often used as a proxy for
medium-term in°ation expectations.
However, some caution is needed in using break-even in°ation. The main
9We have used the computer program WordStat Version 5.0. This program has been
developed by Provalis Research as an add-on feature of the statistical program SimStat. For
more information, see www.provalisresearch.com.
10The key characteristic of in°ation-indexed bond is that, over time, the principal value and
the coupon payments are adjusted on the basis of a measure of in°ation. Cukierman (1977)
is one of the earliest contributions using in°ation-indexed bonds.
7reason is that break-even in°ation may also pick up other factors than expected
in°ation, in particular a liquidity and an in°ation risk premium. This is illus-
trated by the following two equations:
it = rt + ¼e
t + ½t (1)
iind
t = rt + ¸t (2)
where i denotes the yield on a conventional bond, iind denotes the yield on an
indexed bond, r denotes the real interest rate, ¼e denotes expected in°ation,
½ denotes an in°ation risk premium and ¸ denotes a liquidity premium. As
noted, in°ation-indexed bonds were only recently introduced in the euro area.
Investors may have demanded a liquidity premium for holding these bonds, to
compensate for their relative illiquidity. Secondly, investors may require a risk
compensation for holding conventional bonds as actual in°ation may di®er from
expected in°ation.11 Subtracting (2) from (1) shows that break-even in°ation
in this case equals:
BEI = ¼e
t + ½t ¡ ¸t (3)
Initially, a liquidity premium may well have been an important component
in break-even in°ation. However, turnover in the markets for the OATei 2012
security has strongly increased since 2001. The instrument has by now estab-
lished itself and the AFT has since then successfully introduced other issues of
the OATei instrument. For the US, Sack (2000) ¯nds that most of the bias in
break-even in°ation can be attributed to the liquidity premium. He also reports
that changes in break-even in°ation and `corrected' measures of break-even in-
°ation are highly correlated.
Greater clarity regarding future monetary policy could reduce the uncer-
tainty regarding future levels of in°ation and therefore reduce the in°ation risk
11Two other factors a®ecting break-even in°ation are di®erences in duration (due to di®er-
ences in the payment structure) and declining time to maturity. Recently, the ECB (2006)
investigated the e®ects of these issues for French in°ation-indexed bonds and concluded that
`break-even in°ation rates .. seem to be rather good approximations of the preferable zero-
coupon constant maturity measures and are little biased by potential distortions due to du-
ration mismatching (p. 31).' See also Sack (2000) or Kwan (2005) for a discussion of these
issues.
8premium. This would be re°ected in a lower level of break-even in°ation. How-
ever, HÄ ordahl and Tristani (2007) ¯nd that, on average, the in°ation risk pre-
mium calculated using OATei data has not di®ered signi¯cantly from zero over
the EMU sample.
4 Data description
Figure 1 shows ten-year euro area break-even in°ation (solid line) and the oc-
currence of vigilance (the grey diamonds) between June 2003 and March 2007.
The dotted line denotes the ECB's main re¯nancing rate. There are steep up-
ward movements in expected in°ation in late 2003 and early 2004. Starting in
March 2004, the term 'vigilance' is used extensively in communication. After
December 2005, the term is used less often. To be precise, it occurs only six-
teen times in communication. This decline would be in line with the di®erent
interpretation of this keyword after 2005.











































































































































































Occurrences of `vigilance' Break-even inflation (left axis) Main refinancing rate (right axis)
This ¯gure shows euro area break-even in°ation (solid line) and the use of `vigilance' in
ECB communications (the grey diamonds) between June 2003 and March 2007. The dotted
line denotes the ECB policy rate. Dates are denoted in DD/MM/YYYY.
9In comparison, table 2 shows that between March 2004 and November 2005
vigilance was used some 200 times. The second column shows that in 58 cases,
`vigilance` was mentioned without any further quali¯cation. In about a quarter
of the cases, the term `strong vigilance' was used. Quali¯cations with probable
high impact, such as `very strong vigilance' or `extremely vigilant' are seldom
used. We will examine the e®ects of these di®erences in quali¯cations in the
remainder of this paper. To this end, the third and fourth column of table 2 show
two classi¯cations of `vigilance'. Column 3 outlines an a priori classi¯cation of
our reading of ECB code words. The scale is between 1 and 4, where the scale
is increasing in the intensity of the terminology. The scale ranges from the
occurrences of `vigilance' (value 1) through to the transition to `more vigilance'
(value 2) to phases with `high' (value 3) or `very high vigilance' (value 4) or
equivalents of these four cases. The last column presents a scale that ex post
aims to capture the news component in ECB communication by measuring
observations according to the inverse of their relative occurrence. If a particular
term is often used in communication, its occurrence may not be considered as
news anymore. In contrast, if a term is used that has never been used before,
markets will probably react strongly to its occurrence.
5 Empirical model
In the spirit of the `news approach', we model daily changes in break-even in°a-
tion as a linear function of lagged dependents, a dummy variable that measures
the occurrence of `vigilance' and a set of control variables.12 As we ¯nd evidence
of clustered volatility we use a GARCH model. We estimate this model using a
normal distribution or, alternatively, a t-distribution in cases where the Jarque-
Bera statistic rejected normality in the residuals. Our baseline regression model
12Another motivation for looking at changes rather than levels is that unit root tests could
not conclusively dismiss the hypothesis that break-even in°ation is an I(1) series.
10Table 2: `Vigilance': occurrences and two classi¯cations (2003-2005)
Scale 1: Scale 2:
No. of occurrences Keywords News value
n (Scale 1 to 4) (200/n)
Vigilance 58 1 3.4
Quali¯cations:
Strong 46 3 4.3
Continued 28 1 7.1
Remain 19 1 10.5
Particularly 12 3 16.7
Ongoing 9 1 22.2
Very 7 3 28.6
Especially 3 3 66.7
Increased 3 2 66.7
Extremely 2 4 100
Very strong 2 4 100
Warrants 2 1 100
Emphasizes 1 3 200
Enhanced 1 2 200
Heightened 1 2 200
More 1 2 200
Particularly strong 1 4 200
Reinforcing 1 2 200
Special 1 3 200
Stepping up 1 2 200
Still 1 1 200
TOTAL 200
Note: This table describes the quali¯cations used by the ECB when stating the words `vig-
ilance' and `vigilance'. The last two columns outline two classi¯cations of vigilance which
are used in the regression analysis. This table is for the period between 2 June 2003 and 30
November 2005.
11Table 3: Overview of control variables
Macroeconomic releases (surprise component of:)
Euro area
HICP y-o-y growth
Gross domestic product q-o-q growth
Industrial production m-o-m growth
Producer prices index y-o-y growth
Germany
HICP y-o-y growth
Gross domestic product q-o-q growth
IFO indicator level
Industrial production m-o-m growth
Producer price in°ation y-o-y growth
France
HICP y-o-y growth
Gross domestic product q-o-q growth
Industrial production m-o-m growth
Producer price in°ation y-o-y growth
Financial variables
Oil futures Brent crude, log di®erence
Dollar/euro exchange rate log di®erence
FTSE100 log di®erence
Dow Jones Industrial Avg log di®erence
Eurostoxx50 log di®erence
US T-bill 3 months, ¯rst di®erence
US Treasury note 7years, ¯rst di®erence
12is as follows:
¢¼e








t + ¯tt + ²t; ²tjªt » (0;¾2
t) (4)
¾2










t denotes the break-even in°ation rate, Vt is a dummy variable mea-
suring the use of `vigilance', and the zt denotes control variables. Our main
interest is in ¯v as it captures the relationship between ECB communications
and changes in in°ation expectations. We test whether ¯v is signi¯cantly dif-
ferent from zero.
Table 3 describes the control variables. Firstly, we include the surprise com-
ponent for releases of various macroeconomic series. These are taken from
Bloomberg surveys. We include variables for the euro area, France and Ger-
many. Secondly, we take up daily returns on a number of ¯nancial variables,
such as oil futures, stock market indices, the dollar/euro exchange rate and US
T-bills and T-bonds. We use lagged values to circumvent endogeneity problems.
These series are taken from Datastream.13
6 Results
Table 4 shows estimation results for a number of speci¯cations. Column 1
shows a baseline estimation for the period 2 June 2003 to 9 March 2007. On the
basis of the Akaike information criterion, the model is speci¯ed as an AR(1)-
GARCH(1,1) without a constant and trend term. In°ation expectations react
to news on prices and the IFO indicator, and oil futures. Next, we focus on the
period between 2003 and 2005 when `vigilance' was most actively used. Columns
2 to 4 show three estimation results which include measures of `vigilance'. In
all three cases, the coe±cient related to vigilance is negative. Column 2 shows
13We also ran regressions with controls for weekdays, the timing of ECB Governing Council
meetings and FOMC meetings and decisions. This did not lead to any qualitative changes in
our conclusions.
13the results if we use a dummy variable which has the value 1 when `vigilance'
is used in communication, and the value 0 otherwise. The conditional e®ect
of using `vigilance' is a decline of in°ation expectations by a ¯fth of a basis
point (0.0021). The coe±cient is, however, only signi¯cant at the 10% level
(p = 0.08). The results for the two alternative classi¯cations are presented in
columns 3 and 4. Using the classi¯cation based on our keyword scale, we ¯nd a
coe±cient for the e®ect of 'vigilance' equal to -0.001%. This coe±cient is also
signi¯cantly di®erent from zero at the 10% level (p= 0.07). For the model using
the second classi¯cation, based on the news value of a statement, we ¯nd that
the coe±cient for the `vigilance' variable is strongly signi¯cant (p=0.01).
However, as discussed in section 1, the period between June 2003 and Novem-
ber 2005 was not a homogenous period. From Autumn-2005 onwards, it was
increasingly considered likely that the ECB would start to tighten monetary
policy. Incoming macroeconomic data suggested and ECB communication sig-
nalled a change in the policy stance.14 We therefore investigate whether the
e®ects of communication were di®erent in this period by estimating rolling-
window regressions for the model in (4) and (5) using the (0,1) `vigilance'
dummy. Each window includes 180 days. We start on 1 March 2004, so that the
end-point of the ¯rst sample is 5 November 2004. The last estimation sample
ends at 30 November 2005. The estimated coe±cient ¯v in each of these re-
gressions is shown in ¯gure 2. Diamonds are used to denote that the coe±cient
is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero at the 5% level. Figure 2 clearly shows that
timing is important for the results. Initially, the estimated ¯v is not signi¯-
cantly di®erent from zero. Once the estimation window includes the months of
October and November 2005 the coe±cient is signi¯cant. The estimated e®ects
of vigilance range roughly between 0.0035% and 0.0045%. We conclude that
14For example, during the press conference on 1 September 2005, the wording was changed
from `ongoing vigilance' to `particular vigilance', followed by `strong vigilance' at the October
and November press conferences. According to Consensus Forecast, in September only 4.9%
of the respondents expected a rate increase in the next 30 days. In October, this ¯gure was
up to 11.3% and in November it was up to 37.4%, the highest number in 2.5 years.
14Table 4: The importance of being vigilant: regression results
2003 - 2007 2003 - 2005 2006 - 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline (0,1) Keyword News (0,1)
dummy scale scale dummy
Mean equation
Vigilance -0.0021* -0.001* -0.00004** -0.0010
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
¢¼e
t¡1 0.12*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.19*** -0.03
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
¢¼e
t¡2 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Consumer prices (G) 0.03*** 0.06***
(0.01) (0.02)
IFO indicator (G) 0.004*** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Consumer prices (F) 0.01*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.05***
(0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
GDP (F) 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Producer prices (F) 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Brent futures 0.12*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.24***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
US T bond 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Variance equation
®0 0.00** 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
±1 0.08*** 0.07** 0.07** 0.07** 0.05
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
®1 0.87*** 0.88*** 0.88*** 0.88*** 0.84***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.12)
Adjusted R2 6.8% 5.7% 5.7% 5.7% 14.8%
Log likelihood 2897.07 1897.82 1897.86 1898.28 1030.45
Akaike IC -5.85 -5.76 -5.76 -5.76 -6.04
ARCH(2) 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.94
(0.59) (0.99) (0.99) (0.96) (0.39)
Notes: This table presents the results for the regression in equations (1) and (2) in the main
text. (E) denotes euro area, (G) denotes Germany and (F) denotes France. For control
variables, we only report coe±cients signi¯cant at the 5% level. */**/*** denotes signi¯cance
at the 10/5/1 % level. Standard errors are in parentheses. ARCH (2) denotes the F-statistic
for the ARCH LM test with the p-values shown in parentheses.
15the e®ectiveness of communication with respect to in°uencing expectations is
strongly related to the perception of upcoming changes in the monetary policy
stance.






















































































































Coefficient Significant at 5 %
This ¯gure shows the estimated ¯v using 180 days moving windows. The dates are de-
noted in DD/MM/YYYY and represent the endpoint of the sample. The estimations start
at 1 March 2004, so that the ¯rst endpoint is 5 November 2004. The last endpoint is 30
November 2005. Diamonds denote that the coe±cient is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero at
the 5% level.
This raises an interesting issue: did this type of ECB communication con-
tinue to have these e®ects on expectations during the period when the ECB
continued to tighten monetary policy in 2006 and 2007? The answer is `no', as
can be seen in the last column of table 4. The coe±cient ¯v is negative, but
not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero (p=0.71).15 One reason for this result has
already suggested itself: `vigilance' was used less frequently, making it harder
15For this analysis, we have also performed rolling-window regressions. The coe±cient for
16to pick up any e®ect in the estimation. But, the absence of reactions in ex-
pectations also suggests that communication may be most e®ective in shaping
expectations at the turning-points in monetary policy, in this case, the start of
tightening after a prolonged period of constant policy rates.
7 Robustness
We have argued that occurrences of `vigilance' are an adequate representation
of the ECB's assessment of risks to price stability. By focusing on this single
concept, we may be missing important elements of ECB communication. Per-
haps ECB communication has contained other signals that markets have reacted
to. These signals would not be incorporated in our `vigilance' measure which
could lead to biased estimates. To study this, we ¯rst assess whether the use
of `vigilance' in ECB communications was related to in°ationary developments.
Between June 2003 and November 2005, when `vigilance' most often occurred,
it was used in connection with 21 di®erent topics. On 46 occasions, `vigilance'
did not explicitly refer to a certain topic. Out of 197 occurrences of the topics,
`vigilance' referred to `risks to price stability' 48 times. Other topics that were
often mentioned were `in°ation expectations' (24 times), `2nd round e®ects' (23
times), `oil prices' (22 times), `in°ation' (21 times), `M3' (17 times) and `in°a-
tion risks' (8 times). In all, this analysis supports our use of `vigilance' as a
signal of risks to price stability.
We also tested for the e®ects of ECB communications when `vigilance' is not
used. To this end, we include in our baseline regression a variable that is equal to
one if the ECB communicated on a particular day without using `vigilance' and
equal to zero otherwise. The result for the 2003 - 2005 sample is shown in column
1 of table 5. We ¯nd that the absence of `vigilance' in ECB communication
actually coincided with higher levels of break-even in°ation. Further evidence
is provided in ¯gure 3. When incorporating the second half of 2005 in the


















IFO indicator (G) 0.004** 0.004**
(0.00) (0.00)
Consumer prices (F) 0.05*** 0.05***
(0.01) (0.01)
GDP (F) 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01)
Producer prices (F) 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01)
Brent futures 0.08*** 0.08***
(0.02) (0.03)









Adjusted R2 5.4% 5.4%
Log likelihood 1895.65 1895.46
Akaike IC -5.75 -5.75
ARCH(2) 0.00 0.01
(0.99) (0.99)
Notes: For the mean equation, we only report coe±cients signi¯cant at the 5% level. */**/***
denotes signi¯cance at the 10/5/1 % level. In parentheses, standard errors are reported.
18estimation, we ¯nd evidence of a conditional impact of close to a half basis point.
At the same time, there is evidence of a negative reaction earlier in 2005. It is
possible, therefore, that other aspects of communication have been important.
Nevertheless, the e®ects in this case are less marked. On balance, the focus
on `vigilance' seems justi¯ed. Another robustness test is to see what happens
when the ECB does not communicate at all. Perhaps in°ation expectations
would have decreased regardless of whether communication took place. In that
case, we would wrongly attribute the negative change in expectations to central
bank communication. However, as column 2 of table 5 shows, this is not the
case. Between 2003 and 2005, changes in break-even in°ation on days without
communication were slightly positive.16


















































































































































Coefficient Significant at 5 %
Note: This ¯gure shows the estimated coe±cient for the `communication, no vigilance'
dummy using 180 days moving windows. The dates are denoted in DD/MM/YYYY and
represent the endpoint of the sample. The estimations start at 1 March 2004, so that the ¯rst
endpoint is 5 November 2004. The last endpoint is 30 November 2005. Diamonds denote
that the coe±cient is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero at the 5% level.
16Rolling window regressions were also performed in this case without ¯nding signi¯cant
results. Results available upon request.
19Finally, so far we have not addressed the fact that the OATei2012 security
has been o®-the-run since the OATei2015 series was issued in November 2004.
Therefore, we also estimated rolling-window regressions using break-even in°a-
tion derived from the OATei2015 and the OAT2014 series. As ¯gure 4 shows,
the results are very similar to those for the OATei2012 series.


































































Coefficient Significant at 5 %
Note: This ¯gure shows the estimated ¯v using 180 days moving windows and OATei2015
series. The dates are denoted in DD/MM/YYYY and represent the endpoint of the sample.
The ¯rst endpoint is 26 July 2005. The last endpoint is 30 November 2005. Diamonds denote
that the coe±cient is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero at the 5% level.
208 Conclusions
Our key ¯nding is that the ECB's signalling of discomfort with in°ationary
developments through communication has had a negative relationship with
changes in euro area break-even in°ation even during a period when the in-
terest rate instrument was not used. However, this type of communication has
only led to responses in ¯nancial markets when it closely coincided with the
perception of upcoming changes in the ECB's monetary policy stance. Even
more so, the e®ects are found at the start of a tightening phase, but not during
this period. Despite its statistical signi¯cance, the economic signi¯cance of this
type of communication has been small.
There are a number of questions that future research may address. To start
with, it may be worthwhile to investigate this issue at lower frequencies. Perhaps
a series of comments may have a stronger impact on expectations than isolated
statements. It would also be interesting to investigate the high-frequency re-
lationship between communications and in°ation expectations for a number of
other central banks, such as the Bank of England or the Federal Reserve. Fi-
nally, it would be instructive to further explore the possibility of a connection
between communication and the di®erent components of break-even in°ation.
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